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Abstract: This paper offers both theoretical and empirical analyses to explore energy justice from
a policy perspective. We first propose a framework that explicitly connects core functions of clean
energy policy instruments (i.e., regulation, financial incentive, government provision, information,
and education program) to philosophical groundings of energy justice—distributive, procedural,
and recognition justice. To empirically explore distributive energy justice, we examine the racial
and socioeconomic disparities in three government-driven clean energy programs in the United
States, including (1) the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) smart-grid investment
grant (SGIG); (2) utility smart-meter roll out programs; and (3) city government adoption of green
buildings. Results showed that the amount of ARRA funding awarded to utilities was closely
related to racial composition. Inequalities were also found in utility smart-meter programs. Utilities
operating in communities with a larger Hispanic population were less likely to initiate smart-meter
roll out. The intensity of smart-meter technology implementation was positively correlated with
education levels. Our third empirical case showed that government procurement policy can improve
distributive equity for energy-efficient buildings. However, its spillover effects on the private sector
can result in more adoptions in areas with fewer minorities and more highly-educated residents.
Keywords: energy justice; distributive justice; clean energy policies and programs; policy
choice elements
1. Introduction
Rooted in and built upon environmental and climate justice research, the energy justice literature
focuses on equity issues in the processes of energy production, distribution, consumption, and system
transition. Sovacool and his colleagues [1] define energy justice as “a global energy system that
fairly distributes both the benefits and burdens of energy services, and one that contributes to more
representative and inclusive energy decision-making”. Built upon Sovacool’s conceptualization of
energy justice, Hernández argues that four basic rights to energy justice are essential: right to healthy
and sustainable energy production, right to best available energy infrastructure, right to affordable
energy, and right to uninterrupted energy service [2].
Energy justice can be examined through the lenses of three philosophic tenets in social justice
literature: distributive, recognition and procedural justice. Distributive justice deals with the
distribution of material outcomes or public goods [3]. Recognition justice considers which social
groups are ignored or misrepresented [4]. Procedural justice calls for more democracy, openness,
and inclusion in processes of decision-making [5]. The three tenets have been applied to investigate
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equity issues throughout the whole energy system, from the siting of infrastructure [6], to the extraction
of energy resources [7], to energy consumption [8].
When challenges in energy transition are reframed into justice themes, public policy is often
considered as the solution to correct the injustices [3]. However, policies intended to transform the
energy system may present justice issues themselves [4,9]. Environmental and energy economists
have long studied the distributive impacts of energy and carbon taxes [10–12], although their analyses
are often based on hypothetical policies and models. A growing number of studies have empirically
investigated injustices associated with energy and climate policies in the real-world. For instance,
Grover and Daniels [13] demonstrated substantial inequalities in the distribution of feed-in tariff
benefits in the UK and Wales. Walker and Day [5] investigated the injustice related to the fuel poverty
policy in the UK.
With increasing government activities driving clean energy transition, there is an urgent need
to understand energy justice from a policy perspective. In this paper, we explore this important but
overlooked dimension of energy justice by examining equity concerns embedded in clean energy policy
design and implementation in the United States. We focus on clean energy policies and programs for
two reasons. First, low-carbon energy technology innovations are highly relevant for climate justice
because of their capability to change the costs and benefits of greenhouse gases emission reduction
scenarios [14]. They can also affect communities’ climate change adaptation capability. Secondly,
the development of clean energy reduces environmental pollution from fossil fuel-based power plants.
The investment and siting decisions for clean energy technologies can have additional implications
for distributive environmental justice. Thirdly, access to best available energy infrastructure has not
been extensively studied compared to other basic rights in energy justice, such as access to affordable
energy [5,15].
This paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss when and where equity issues arise
in various clean energy policy contexts. We then propose a framework for analyzing key justice
questions in the design and implementation of clean energy policies and programs. The framework
explicitly connects core functions of policy instruments (regulation, financial incentive, government
provision, information, and education) to the three energy justice tenets (i.e., distributive, recognition,
and procedural justice). In Sections 3 and 4, we offer three brief empirical analyses to investigate
distributive justice concerns in real-world clean energy policies and programs in the United States:
(1) the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) smart-grid investment grant (SGIG);
(2) American utility smart-meter roll out programs; and (3) American city adoption of green buildings.
We conclude this paper by revisiting our empirical results in light of our framework.
2. Theoretical Framework
In recent years, the energy democracy movement in the United States, Europe, and other places
in the world has pushed forward a systematic agenda of energy transition, which aims to decentralize
renewable energy production, empower citizens to become prosumers, create green jobs, and support
local community economic development [16]. This movement further calls for and justifies policy
integration that links social justice and economic equity with clean energy transitions [16]. Miller et
al. [17] argue that the transformation of the energy sociotechnical system would likely redefine energy
politics at the local, national, and global levels in the future. An emerging group of studies have
pointed out the need for “justice-aware” energy policymaking, and discussed the ways to incorporate
justice considerations in energy decision-making [1,16].
Munro et al. [18] argue that recognition justice is critical in energy policy development as it enables
epistemological reflexivity and prevents marginalizing the knowledge, experience, and voices of the
energy-poor. Alvial-Palavicino and Ureta examine how justice claims can be incorporated into the
development and adoption of electricity tariff policies [19]. Sovacool and Dworkin [3] argue that energy
decision-making shall consider eight aspects of energy justice, including availability, affordability,
due process, good governance, sustainability, and intergenerational and intragenerational equity and
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responsibility. Islar et al. use the Sovacool and Dworkin [3] principles to evaluate the feasibility of
energy justice in Nepalese national energy policies [20]. Regardless of these scholarly endeavors,
there is a lack of systemic or comprehensive knowledge about how policy design elements are related
to the different philosophic tenets of energy justice concerns.
To establish a theoretical framework in which to organize the wide array of clean-energy-related
policies and programs with prominent justice components, we propose beginning with a standard
taxonomy of common policy instruments (see, [21,22]) in the clean energy policy regime in the United
States. Here, clean energy policies are defined as those that promote the adoption and diffusion
of sustainable or low-carbon energy technologies, such as energy efficiency (EE), renewable energy
(RE), smart grids, electric vehicles, etc. Following Bardach and Patashnik [23] and Vedung [24],
we group clean energy policy measures into four broad categories—regulatory, financial, government
provision, and information and education policies. Of course, some policies can overlap multiple
categories. (See more detailed discussions of clean energy policy instruments in the US by Carley and
colleagues [23,24]).
Design of clean energy policy instruments often involves critical elements or parameters that can
affect distributive, procedural or other aspects of equity and justice in the policy. In the following
section, we provide an overview of when and where injustices may emerge in various clean energy
policy contexts, and what policy design elements could potentially promote energy justice. Table 1
provides a summary of our discussion, and links these example policy aspects to the three tenets in
energy justice.
Table 1. Examples of justice considerations in clean energy policy design and implementation.
General Category Policy Instruments Policy Design Options Energy Justice Tenets
Regulatory
Utility regulation Electricity prices Distributive
Siting of energy infrastructure Distributive; procedural
Mandatory targets and quotas
Target setting Distributive
Penalty Distributive
Redistribution of penalty funds Distributive
Opt-out options Recognition
Eligibility of technologies and systems Distributive




Eligibility of technologies and systems Distributive
Interconnection standards
Application information and procedures Procedural
Agreement form Procedural
Eligibility of technologies and systems Distributive
Financial
Loans, grants, tax credits,
rebates, and feed-in tariffs
Eligibility and selection criteria Distributive
Payment levels Distributive




Supply Quality, prices of energy supplied Distributive
Where, how to extract fuel All
Procurement
Procurement training and assistance Procedural; recognition







Target group selection Recognition
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2.1. Regulatory Instruments
In the United States, state public service commissions (PSCs) closely regulate investment decisions,
operations, and electricity rates of investor owned utilities (IOUs), which serve over seventy percent of
customers in the United States in 2014 [25]. Regulations and rules adopted by PSCs have an influential
role in utility clean energy programs [26,27]. For grid infrastructure investment, IOUs need to get
approval from PSCs and recover project costs by raising electric rates. Equity concerns are twofold
here: (1) whether the low-income groups are more adversely harmed by price increases; and (2)
whether the benefits of grid improvements are equally shared among communities. Most IOUs are
required by law to offer “just and reasonable rates” to all customers, with various levels of low-income
support provided to the poor, such as discounted rates, arrearage forgiveness, limitations on service
termination, and low/no cost energy efficiency [28]. Nonetheless, low-income groups are often more
likely to fall behind on utility payment and/or experience utility shut-offs [2]. In terms of the siting of
clean energy infrastructure, empirical evidence shows that procedural justice in the siting processes
and permitting decisions is necessary for a more effective and fair project development [29].
States also establish mandatory targets or quotas to achieve a certain market share of clean energy.
Typical examples include renewable portfolio standard (RPS) and energy efficiency resource standard
(EERS). To promote efficiency results, penalties are often included in RPS and EERS policy design.
Utilities have to make alternative compliance payments (ACPs) to the state in order to make up any
deficit in the compliance obligation under relevant legislation; moreover, civil penalties may exist as the
second-tier consequence of failing to meet mandatory targets [30]. The design of ACPs allows society
to value fossil-fuel-based energy source at its full cost, which is an indicator of justice throughout
the energy supply chain [31]. How penalty funds are spent also have important justice implications.
Targeted redistribution allows clean energy to be subsidized by fossil-fuel-based power generation.
It can also reduce income inequality in clean energy financing. For instance, Massachusetts uses
the ACP for RPS to fund its solar loan program. Fixed low-interest loans are provided to residents
purchasing solar photovoltaic (PV) systems, and income-based loan support is available to enable
access to solar PV systems by low-income families [32]. (Households with incomes less than 80% of
the state median income are eligible for a 30% loan principal paid by the Solar Loan Program).
Another type of regulation governs access to an electric grid. Like other monopolies, electric
utility companies often dominate the electricity market. Consumers have limited access to the power
generation and distribution systems. Net metering policies and interconnection standards have
been adopted by many American states to encourage customer-owned distributed energy systems.
Net metering policies allow customers to use power generated from their on-site facilities to offset
their electricity consumption and sell excess generation to the utility at a predetermined price.
Interconnection standards establish standardized processes and technical requirements for connecting
distributed generation (DG) systems to the electric grid. Both policies enhance self-energy dependence
and can contribute to the notion of “energy democracy” [33]. However, these policies can have different
impacts on social groups. Empirical evidence already shows that high-usage customers benefit more
from the net metering program than low-usage customers [34]. While the poor often have limited
upfront capital for distributed renewables, these policies may unintentionally benefit the wealthy
households more than the poor, thus widening the gaps in accessing clean energy infrastructure
across communities.
2.2. Financial Incentives
Government financial incentives for clean energy include grant and loan programs, tax credits
and rebates, and feed-in-tariffs (FITs). On the one hand, financial incentives can enhance distributive
justice as they lower the capital barrier and encourage universal access to decentralized, sustainable,
and affordable energy sources [35]. On the other hand, public funds are often sourced from tax
revenues or electricity tariffs paid by all consumers, and then transferred to clean energy developers.
Under a high FIT scheme, for instance, producers may be overcompensated while consumers bear the
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cost of technology development [36]. The low-income groups can be disproportionally affected by
rate increases. In the long term, when costs of renewable energy production decrease, transferring
funds from consumers to renewable energy producers can become unfair. Deliberate policy design,
especially the payment structure and payment duration, is essential to ensure distributive justice of
financial policies.
Beneficiaries of financial incentives highly depend on policy design elements such as the eligibility
and selection criteria. Borenstein [37] demonstrates that electric rate design in California particularly
influences which customers receive tax credits and other incentives. Some empirical studies conclude
that financial incentives for clean energy technologies tend to benefit wealthy families [37,38]. To help
overcome capital barriers and promote distributive justice, some financial policies (e.g., the federal
Weatherization Assistance Program and the EPA’s Clean Energy Incentive Program) provide funding
for RE and EE projects to only low-income families. Some states proposed a higher percent RE tax
credit for low-income families. For instance, Maryland SB 926 proposed a 50% credit for low-income
communities and a 35% credit elsewhere. Others (e.g., the Energy Loan Program in Missouri) target
energy saving investments in public schools, higher education institutions, not-for-profit hospitals,
and local governments.
The job and employment effects of government subsidies create second-tier justice concerns.
Jobs can be shifted away from fossil fuel related sectors to clean energy related sectors under
government financial incentives. There may be also geographical shifts in employment. For instance,
a majority of the operations and maintenance (O&M) jobs for renewable energy systems were based on
established wind plants in rural and remote areas [39]. Some other studies reveal that 73.6% of the solar
workforce in the U.S. in 2016 were white [40]. Black or African American and Hispanic accounted for
6.6% and 17.2% of the total solar workforce, respectively [40]. To promote social equity, the design of
financial incentives needs to guarantee that local residents and minority groups are equally benefited.
2.3. Government Provision and Procurement
Government provision of clean energy can affect multiple aspects of the energy market and
different social groups. Government-owned utility companies (mostly municipal utilities) are often
responsible for local level clean energy technology deployment and electricity service provision.
How retail electricity prices are set, what renewable energy sources to invest, and where to site the
infrastructure all raise distributive justice concerns. Granting access to renewable resources on public
lands and building transmission lines to transport electricity from remote generation facilities can
particularly influence the rural communities [41]. Inviting inputs from diverse stakeholders and
ensuring that local residents are represented in the siting processes can enhance procedural and
recognition justice [42].
Public procurement policies for energy efficient technologies, green buildings, and other clean
energy technologies have been adopted at the federal, state, and local levels. The Energy Policy Act
2005 for instance, requires federal agencies to procure EE products, photovoltaic solar electric systems,
fuel cell vehicles, and hydrogen energy systems. In 2015, Executive Order 13693 set up an RE target of
30% by 2025 for all federal agencies. In addition to clean energy systems, government adoption of green
buildings is common at the state and city level (see Matisoff et al. [43] for a comprehensive review).
Procurement policies have distributive equity concerns as they can affect the amount, type,
location, and public users of sustainable energy technologies that are being adopted. This can be siting
decisions and which communities get to enjoy the greener facilities, but it can also be the spillover—as
procurement can spur local markets to develop and then the private-sector starts producing more of
the greener infrastructure [44,45]. Procurement policies might also involve procedural and recognition
issues if the process by which procurement decisions are made does or does not involve certain groups.
If minority-owned business enterprises (MBEs), for instance, are too small to do green energy supply,
then they might be at a disadvantage in getting government contracts. The Energy Policy Act 2005
provides training and assistance to help small businesses engage in clean energy public procurement
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projects. Some procurement policies specify a percentage of contracts awarded to women and MBE
firms, which address procedural and recognition justice. Whether a state or local government has MBE
certification may also promote the inclusion of diverse social groups in the public contracting and
procurement processes [46].
2.4. Information and Education Policy
Information and education policy provides the public with knowledge of the benefits and
potential of clean energy technologies, as well as the availability of government incentives and
assistance. It also equips the public with knowledge and expertise that allow them to engage in energy
decision-making. High levels of community involvement, education, and information on energy issues
promote procedural justice [4], which may then contribute to fair and equitable outcomes in the energy
sector [31,47]. Certain social groups particularly lack information about clean energy technologies,
such as the young and less educated groups [48]. Specially designed information and education
policies targeting these groups can enhance recognition justice.
Most justice implications discussed above come directly from policy designs. There are also
distributive impacts due to price effects, where policies affect market prices faced by consumers and
firms. Studies using economic modeling approaches have shown varying impacts of clean energy
policies on electricity prices [49,50]. Energy justice scholars and policymakers may benefit from
working with economists to identify and explore clean energy policy proposals that reconcile equity
and efficiency.
3. Empirical Case Studies
The three philosophical tenets—distributive justice, recognition justice, and procedural justice—
are equally important in understanding energy justice. To provide more empirical evidence of how the
distributive justice lens can be applied to clean energy policies and programs, this section presents
three case study analyses. Our analysis focuses only on distributive impacts pertaining to the access
to modern energy infrastructure and services in the United States, which is heavily influenced by
government regulations and incentives [27]. It is noteworthy that this is neither a comprehensive
nor a generalizable justice evaluation for all clean energy programs. Instead, our goal is to conduct
an exploratory case analyses to understand whether poor or minority groups are less likely to benefit
from clean energy technology deployment programs driven by different categories of public policies.
Our focus on distributive energy justice does not imply that we privilege distributive justice over
procedural or recognitional justice. In doing so, the case studies provide insights on the distribution of
benefits of government energy policies and programs. This supplements the empirical literature of
distributive energy justice that focuses on the distribution of risks and costs of energy policies, such as
in the case of shale gas policy [7] and solar roll-out programs [51].
The three empirical cases selected represent three different clean energy programs at the federal,
municipal, and utility levels in the United States. They allow us to examine closely social justice
concerns and consequences related to clean energy policies and programs. The US federal government
financial investment in “smart grids” and utility smart-meter programs offer prime examples of
financial incentives and utility regulations affecting a transition to clean energy with important equity
implications. In addition, where municipal governments build and use green buildings have important
energy equity implications that directly follow from procurement policies.
3.1. An Overview of the Three Empirical Cases
Case 1: Political distribution of ARRA SGIG. Our 1st empirical case analyzes distributive
justice implications of clean energy financial incentives, with a focus on government provision of
grants and matching funds. In particular, we examine the fairness of the political distribution of
the Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) in the United States, the largest program for electric power
grid modernization efforts under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 [52].
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The Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) at the Department of Energy (DOE) used
a merit-based, competitive process to select and fund SGIG projects. Ninety-nine projects were selected
from over 400 proposals submitted by electric utilities and other eligible organizations, with a total
investment of 8 billion dollars [53]. The ARRA SGIG represents one of the largest public investments in
clean energy technologies in the world. How funds have been transferred from the federal government
to utility companies all over the country may raise important equity concerns. In this case analysis,
we identify characteristics of utilities that benefit the most and least under this federal financial
incentive, including utility ownership, and the racial composition and income levels of communities
served by utilities.
Case 2: Utility smart meter roll out. Our 2nd empirical case focuses on distributive justice of
clean energy technology deployment programs led by electric utilities. As discussed in Section 2,
utility investment in grid infrastructure improvement is often heavily regulated by state public service
commissions or local governments. In this case study, we investigate whether or not closely regulated
utility clean energy programs leads to uneven deployment of clean energy infrastructure among social
groups. We focus particularly on smart meters (also known as advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI)), which are considered as the cornerstone and enabling technology in a smart grid system.
Smart meters have been installed by many utilities in the US since the early 2000s, and the deployment
process has been heavily influenced by public policies [54]. We test whether or not utility smart
meter programs are rolled out in selected communities, and whether utility regulation by public
service commissions or local governments has resulted in social inequality in community access to
smart meters.
Case 3: Municipal government adoption of green buildings. Our 3rd empirical case examines
distributive justice of government procurement policies, particularly municipal government adoption
of green buildings. As buildings account for a very large share of energy consumption, high performing
and sustainable buildings play an important role in residential and commercial energy efficiency and
distributed renewable energy development. Twenty-four states and over one hundred cities in the
United States have adopted mandates that require government buildings to be Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design (LEED) certified (or equivalent) [43]. This regional public procurement
policy may lead to a cluster of green building in some communities but not others. In this case analysis,
we use urban LEED certification data to understand where public green buildings have been adopted,
and whether there is any difference in justice implications between public and private adoptions.
3.2. Data and Methods
The current methodological approach of energy justice analysis differs greatly from that
of environmental justice [8]. A large group of energy justice studies focuses on the right to
affordable energy, and the intersection of energy and poverty [5,15,55]. Some have examined whether
communities bear different costs of and face different risks from clean energy programs [7,51]. In the
environmental justice literature, scholars have extensively investigated the inequalities in the siting of
energy facilities, such as fossil-fuel-based power plants [56] and nuclear energy plants [57]. There has
been a common omission in current energy justice studies regarding access to sustainable energy
infrastructure, or the distribution of benefits of government-driven clean energy programs.
To understand the justice implications of clean energy programs, we propose to draw upon
environmental justice discourse, and posit clean energy infrastructure as a type of environmental
amenity that can potentially reduce air pollution and adverse health effects for the public. The goal
of our empirical case studies is to explore the distributive justice implications of clean energy
programs in the United States, with a focus on the distribution of program benefits. This study
hence improves the understanding of racial and socioeconomic disparities in community access to
modern sustainable energy infrastructure, and contributes to the literature that links environmental
justice and energy justice.
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We follow the conventional statistical approach widely used in environmental justice studies
(see for instance [58,59]) in our research design, data collection, and analysis. Specifically, we identify
which communities benefit from clean energy programs and compare the socio-economic and racial
characteristics of those communities to communities that do not benefit. Evidence of injustice is defined
as when communities that benefit from clean energy programs have significantly higher income levels
and/or lower percentages of minority population. We do not consider how risks and hazards of
the energy system are more broadly (e.g., the exposure to air pollution associated with electricity
generation) distributed among communities.
3.2.1. Unit of Analysis
Unit of analysis in conventional environmental justice analysis refers to the choice of areal unit at
which demographic data are presented and described [58]. It also defines the geographical boundary
for the “community” analyzed in statistical analysis [58].
For Case 1, we investigate whether racial and socioeconomic characteristics of communities
served by utilities receiving federal ARRA SGIG grants are significantly different from those without
SGIG funding. Here, the unit of analysis was individual utility. We used ArcGIS to link utility service
boundary maps, census tract boundary maps, and tract-level demographics, which allowed us to
calculate utility level demographics. We then integrated utility level demographics with utility level
SGIG funding data.
For Case 2, the unit of analysis was also individual utility. Based on ArcGIS work in Case
1, we integrated utility level demographics with utility level AMI meters roll out information.
This allowed us to identify utility-level demographic characteristics associated with smart
meter deployment.
The analysis for Case 3 was at the metropolitan and micropolitan statistical area (MMSA) level,
which is also known as “core based statistical area” (CBSA). Each CBSA contains at least one urban
area of 10,000 or more population [60]. Geographical boundary maps and demographics for MMSA
were collected from the census bureau, which were then linked to LEED building certification data
in ArcGIS.
3.2.2. Explanatory Variables
Standard environmental justice analysis investigates disproportionate distribution of
environmental hazards on minority and low-income communities [61,62]. Following this approach,
we tested racial and income inequity in our three cases. For the race effect, two variables representing
ethnic minority groups were used in this study: the proportion of the population identified as Hispanic
and the proportion of the population identified as Black (See Table 2 for detailed information on the
variables’ description and data sources). For the income effect, we used natural logarithm of average
family income (Case 1 and Case 2) and medium household income (Case 3) as the operational variables.
Due to data availability at different areal units, the operationalization of explanatory variables varies
across the three cases.
Several other important socioeconomic factors that may influence clean energy technology
deployment were also included in our statistical models. Education level likely affects public
perception of green technologies, such as in the cases of renewable energy [63], water recycling
and desalination [64], and carbon capture and storage [65]. In Case 1 and Case 2, education level was
measured by the share of population who had graduated high school. In Case 3, education level was
measured by the share of population who had a bachelor’s degree or higher.
In Case 1, in order to consider the political context of stimulus funding redistribution, we included
an election variable in the model. It was measured by the percentage of people voting for Obama in
the 2012 election in a given utility service territory. We first obtained county-level election data from
The Guardian [66], and then used ArcGIS to link the county-level data with utility service boundary
maps to calculate the utility-level election data.
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Population and population density may affect energy service requirements by local communities,
and it is often a determinant for energy infrastructure design and development [67]. In Case 1 and
Case 2, we measure population density by total number of people per square meter. Natural logarithm
of density and population were controlled for in statistical models of Case 1 and Case 2. In Case
3, we controlled for population, population change between 2000 and 2005 (a time period prior to
most LEED certifications), and concurrent population change between 2005 and 2013, as population
dynamics are likely to correlate with construction of new buildings in a region.
In Case 1 and Case 2, we also empirically tested the impact of utility ownership on the
access to energy-specific federal grants and utility clean energy investments. A dummy variable
for investor-owned utilities (IOUs) was included in utility-level models. Descriptive statistics for all
variables are presented in Table 3.
Table 2. Variable description and sources.
Variable Description Source
Case 1 & Case 2
ARRA dummy Whether or not a utility received ARRA SmartGrid Investment Grant funding Energy.gov
Per capita ARRA Per capita dollar Recovery Act funds receivedby a utility Energy.gov
AMI penetration rates Share of AMI meters in 2015, measured as totalAMI meter counts divided by total customers EIA 861 Form: File 8, File 2
AMI dummy Whether or not smart meter roll out is takenplace in 2015 EIA 861 Form: File 8, File 2
Hispanic Share of population identifying self as Hispanicor Latino
2006–10 American
Community Survey
Black Share of population identifying self as Black orAfrican American
2006–10 American
Community Survey
Income Average family income ($) (log) 2006-1–0 AmericanCommunity Survey
Density
Population density (log), measured as total
population divided by utility service territory
area (in square meters)
2006–10 American
Community Survey
Population Total population in the utility service territoryarea (log)
2006–10 American
Community Survey
High school Share of population who have graduated highschool
2006–10 American
Community Survey
IOU Whether or not an investor-owned utility EIA 861 Form: File 2
Obama vote Share of population voted for Obama in 2012 The Guardian
Case 3
GovLEED
Total number of government-owned buildings
certified under the LEED NC v2.0–v2.2
standards
USGBC
TotalLEED Total number of buildings certified under theLEED NC v2.0–v2.2 standards USGBC
Hispanic Percent population identifying self as Hispanicor Latino (%)
2013 American Community
Survey
Black Percent population identifying self as Black orAfrican American (%)
2013 American Community
Survey
Population Total population (log) 2013 American CommunitySurvey
College Percent bachelor’s degree or higher (%) 2013 American CommunitySurvey
mIncome Median Households income ($) (log) 2013 American CommunitySurvey
%popchg00–05 Percent population change between 2000 and2005 (%) Census 2000, Census 2005
%popchg05–13 Percent population change between 2005 and2013 (%) Census 2005, Census 2013
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean SD Dev Min Max
Case 1 & Case 2
ARRA dummy 474 0.034 0.181 0.000 1.000
Per capita ARRA 474 4.559 31.347 0.000 375.227
AMI dummy 474 0.405 0.491 0.000 1.000
AMI penetration rates 474 0.298 0.444 0.000 1.000
Hispanic 474 0.067 0.113 0.005 0.913
Black 474 0.071 0.128 0.000 0.826
Income 474 11.124 0.231 9.954 12.245
Density 474 −10.032 1.786 −15.290 −5.228
Population 474 9.457 2.612 0.834 16.381
High school 474 0.355 0.070 0.056 0.507
IOU 474 0.105 0.308 0.000 1.000
Obama vote 473 0.450 0.125 0.178 0.849
Case 3
GovLEED 515 2.907 7.354 0.000 65.000
TotalLEED 515 7.122 17.212 0.000 142.000
Hispanic 515 12.577 17.534 0.400 99.500
Black 514 10.977 11.219 0.300 63.400
Population 515 12.339 1.093 10.898 16.809
College 515 24.975 8.247 9.300 58.500
mIncome 515 10.748 0.219 9.423 11.424
%popchg00–05 465 1.615 6.398 −16.696 29.917
%popchg05–13 467 11.749 16.692 −42.541 258.584
3.2.3. Regression Models and Dependent Variables
In Case 1, federal subsidies for smart grid technologies were distributed through utilities in the US.
We used a two-stage double hurdle model to identify communities that were particularly benefiting
from the distribution of ARRA funding. The model was first proposed by Cragg [68] in 1971 to allow
for two independent processes. Using the two-stage double hurdle model hence allows us to explore
whether community demographic characteristics play different roles in the recipient selection and
grant distribution processes.
The first process was the decision to choose utility recipients for ARRA SGIG grants.
The dependent variable was dichotomous, measuring whether or not a utility was selected for
a SGIG grant. The second process measured the amount of ARRA SGIG grant awarded to a utility.
The dependent variable was a continuous variable measuring per capita dollar amount of an ARRA
SGIG grant received by a utility. Per unit subsidy has been used by past studies examining policy
impact on clean technology adoption (i.e., Kerosene subsidies in India [69]). Data about ARRA
SGIG utility recipients and dollar amounts of awarded grants were collected and compiled from
the DOE website.
Similarly in Case 2, we estimate a two-stage double hurdle model for utility smart meter roll
out. In the first stage, the decision to deploy smart meters had to be made. The dependent variable
measured whether or not AMI meter roll out had taken place in a given utility service territory.
It was coded as 1 if the number of AMI meters installed by the utility was positive, and 0 otherwise.
The second stage concerned the “intensity” of technology diffusion or market penetration of AMI
meters. How many smart meters to install may depend on various factors such as funding availability,
utility decision, and social acceptance. The dependent variable for the second stage was the AMI meter
penetration rate in a utility service territory. In the literature, technology penetration rate is a widely
used indicator of accessibility to clean technologies [27,70]. Total AMI meter counts and total meter
counts for each electric utility in 2015 were compiled from File 8 of Form EIA-861 from U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA).
When technology adoption is measured by count variables (i.e., the number of solar PV arrays
adopted by a residential sector [38]), negative binomial models are often estimated. For Case 3,
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we followed this approach and estimated negative binomial models to identify potential associations
between demographic variables and the adoption of green buildings in American metropolitan and
micropolitan statistical areas. We differentiated between public and private adoptions by using two
dependent variables: counts of all LEED certified buildings and counts of only government-owned
LEED certified buildings in a metropolitan or micropolitan statistical area.
All statistical models in this study were estimated using Stata. Sensitivity analyses were conducted
and results are included in the Supplementary Materials.
3.2.4. Data Collection and Integration
The areal unit of Case 1 and 2 is utility service territory. We requested state electric utility service
territory maps from public service commissions or the geographic information system (GIS) offices
of all fifty states. We were able to obtain GIS shapefiles from fifteen states, including Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, South Carolina, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. These fifteen states are pretty representative
of the nation, with a high level of diversity in geographical location, climate zone, political ideology,
income, and ethnic groups in our data. In 2016, 36.8% of the US population lived in these fifteen states.
Utilities from the fifteen states received $783.3 million in ARRA SGIG, accounting for 23.0% of the total.
(See Figure 1 for details about ARRA SGIG projects in the fifteen states). For Case 1, two states (CT
and WI) were dropped from the dataset, as some of their SGIG recipients were companies owned by
multiple utilities.
Census tract geographical boundary maps and tract level demographic data were obtained
from the Census Bureau. We used ArcGIS and an area weighting approach to aggregate tract-level
demographic data and county-level election data to utility level. The list of utilities receiving SGIG
funding and the amount of SGIG funding received by each utility was obtained from the smartgrid.gov
website. Data on the count of smart meters installed by each utility were obtained from the US Energy
Information Administration.
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Case 3 focuses on city-level green building adoptions in the United States. We collected boundary
maps and demographic data for US metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas from the Census
Bureau. The LEED dataset was collected from the US Green Building Council (USGBC), which includes
addresses and owner types for all buildings certified under the LEED New Construction (NC) v2.0–v2.2
standards. In light of other labeling schemes for energy-efficient buildings (e.g., EnergyStar), we use
a consistent definition of new green buildings based on these LEED NC standards—a prominent
certification system starting in 2004 and lasting for a decade. LEED certified buildings were geocoded
in ArcGIS. The total counts of government-owned LEED buildings and all LEED buildings in each
metropolitan or micropolitan statistical area were then calculated in ArcGIS and used as dependent
variables for Case 3.
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4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Case 1: Political Distribution of ARRA SGIG
The estimated coefficients for income are negative in both stages of Case 1, but only significant in
Stage 1 (Table 4). Hispanic and Black are all negative, but only the Hispanic variable is significant in
Stage 2 of Case 1. The results demonstrate that utilities serving lower-income communities are more
likely to receive SGIG funding. Yet, conditional on their receiving SGIG, utilities operating in areas
with smaller shares of Hispanic population tend to receive more federal funding.
There are several reasons why projects involving more low-income customers are more likely
to be selected for the SGIG. First, energy infrastructure in low-income communities may face more
severe problems with aging and inadequacy in providing accurate electric bills than that in other
communities. These communities often need investments in grid upgrades the most. Utilities serving
those areas may take the SGIG application opportunity to plan and propose for grid infrastructure
updates, leveraging federal funds to equip low-income communities with resilient and sustainable
energy infrastructure. For instance, Entergy New Orleans in Louisiana has particularly highlighted in
their SGIG project description that funds will be used to install smart grid technologies for low-income
families to reduce energy use and electricity costs [71].
Second, studies have shown that low-income consumers often have less awareness of and
favorable feelings toward smart-grid and smart-meter technologies [72]. Without support from public
funds, the low-income communities may be left behind in the nation’s grid modernization process.
The inclination of the DOE to award smart grid funds to lower-income groups hence contributes to
a more equal outcome in infrastructure development across income groups. A closer examination of
the SGIG selection criteria reveals important justice components in policy design. The SGIG policy
states that selected projects shall promote power quality for all types of consumers, enable informed
participation by consumers, accommodate different types of electricity generation and storage options,
and enhance system efficiency and resilience [73]. The selection of SGIG recipients shall ensure
“an efficacious portfolio of SGIG projects”, with a diversity in organization types, sizes, and geographic
areas [73]. The evidence in Table 4 suggests that this directive was not idle rhetoric, at least for
low-income communities.
Table 4. Results of Case 1 and 2: SGIG funding and AMI roll-out.
Case 1: Distribution of Federal Financial Incentives
(Craggit Model)




Whether or not a Utility
Received SGIG Funding
Stage 2:
Per capita Dollar SGIG
Received by a Utility
Stage 1:
AMI Roll out Decision
Stage 2:
AMI Penetration Rates
Hispanic −0.470 −897.7 * −1.313 * 0.0663
(1.139) (487.5) (0.728) (0.469)
Black −2.293 −287.7 0.270 0.304
(1.421) (417.1) (0.589) (0.320)
Income −1.614 * −141.6 0.551 0.146
(0.946) (491.5) (0.380) (0.211)
Density 0.0831 39.51 −0.149 *** −0.0415 *
(0.0855) (28.39) (0.0395) (0.0241)
Population 0.318 *** −33.93 0.278 *** −0.0226
(0.112) (36.75) (0.0325) (0.0205)
High School −2.175 −788.0 0.133 1.142 *
(3.002) (1167) (1.238) (0.685)
IOU −0.102 −121.8 −0.542 ** −0.464 ***
(0.434) (80.16) (0.228) (0.144)
Obama vote 3.129 ** 315.0
(1.218) (512.5)
Constant 12.93 2722 −10.49 ** −1.510
(10.62) (5120) (4.572) (2.539)
Observations 473 473 474 474
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Results for Stage 2 in Case 1 show that, among all recipients, utilities serving a larger Hispanic
community tends to be funded on smaller-scale SGIG projects. Utilities serving larger Hispanic
populations may face greater opposition from their customers for modern energy infrastructure and
services. A lack of technical experience combined with a large, inexperienced customer segment may
restrict these utilities to pilot- or smaller-scale smart-grid deployments.
The percentage of population that voted for Obama in 2012 and total population served by the
utility affect the SGIG program selection, but not the amount of funding awarded. Utilities receiving
SGIG funding are more likely to operate in areas with more liberal voters, and they are also more likely
to serve a larger group of customers. Population density, education, or utility ownership did not have
significant impact on who was awarded SGIG funding or the amount of funding awarded.
4.2. Case 2: Utility Smart Meter Roll Out
Case 2 exhibits some inequalities in utility smart meter deployment. The estimated coefficient
for Hispanic is negative and significant in Stage 1 of Case 2. This indicates that utilities serving
smaller Hispanic populations are more likely to initiate smart meter roll out in their service territory.
The technology deployment process, closely regulated by public service commissions or local
governments, has led to racial inequity in the siting of clean energy infrastructure.
It is usually large cities, such as Houston and Los Angeles, that are more likely to attract
Hispanic population. Most of the Hispanic population resides in urban areas [74]. This indicates
that utilities serving the urban Hispanic population may be lagging behind in providing up-to-date
modern intelligent energy infrastructure to their customers. Given the data and analysis in Case 2,
these utilities may have difficulties keeping pace with new infrastructure deployment demands within
a high population growth region. Alternatively, language barriers or other priorities may mean these
utilities face less pressure to install this technology. Future research is needed to investigate whether
demographic changes in these cities likely exaggerate the racial inequalities in access to clean energy
technology infrastructure.
As of 2012, over 80% of smart meters were installed by IOUs [75]. For these privately-owned
companies, smart-meter and smart-grid investments are reviewed in the context of general rate case
proceedings. To ensure cost-effective technology deployment, state public service commissions (e.g.,
Ohio Case No. 05-1500-EL-COI) often require IOUs to identify and group customer classes, and to
evaluate costs and benefits accrued to customers, before they invest in smart meters. This policy
design may explain the results of Stage 1 in Case 2, as utilities’ cost-benefit analysis (CBA) results for
smart-meter investment vary greatly, depending on the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of
their customer groups. Some disadvantaged and vulnerable communities (e.g., Hispanics) may be left
behind in the grid modernization process if they cannot pass CBA tests required by utility regulators.
Although the intent of a cost-benefit test for utility investments is to make sure energy services are
affordable to all people, this policy design choice may have impaired racial equality in utility clean
energy deployment.
Publicly owned utilities, especially municipally-owned utilities, often operate as a functional
unit of city governments. Their governance structures are similar to other local government agencies.
Energy customers are also voters who elect the officials governing the utility. Therefore, municipal
utilities tend to be more responsive and flexible to customer needs, and more innovative in deploying
clean energy technologies [76]. This explains the significant and negative coefficients for the IOU
variable in Case 2: publicly-owned utilities are more likely to start smart-meter roll out and are more
successful in technology implementation than IOUs. Another reason might be that IOUs have to
go through the regulatory hurdle to make new investments, while municipally owned utilities and
cooperatives do not.
Results for Stage 2 in Case 2 in Table 4 show that, after utilities commit themselves in smart-meter
deployment, there is no significant disparity in technology penetration across racial or socioeconomic
groups. In the technology implementation process, many state PSCs require utilities to provide a smart
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meter opt-out option (i.e., Michigan PSC Order (September 11, 2012), Case No. U-17000). This allows
customers to quit smart meters and keep their traditional analog meters. Opt-out options recognize
different public perceptions of new technologies, which may have contributed to the equity and
fairness in smart meter implementation (i.e., recognition justice).
In addition, the estimated coefficient for education is positive and significant in Stage 2, Case 2.
This shows that education plays a positive role in technology implementation: better-educated
communities are associated with higher smart-meter penetration rates. This confirms previous findings
on the positive role of education on social acceptance of clean energy technology [77].
Estimated coefficients for density are negative and significant in both Stages of Case 2. Density
matters for both the initiation of smart-meter roll out projects and the intensity of technology
implementation. Smart meters seem to diffuse slower in more densely populated areas. Utilities
with low-customer densities or geographically dispersed territories may have the greatest savings
potential for smart meters: it is much easier for them to justify their investment based on operational
cost saving (i.e., avoided meter reading, remote connections/disconnections) [78].
4.3. Case 3: Municipal Government Adoption of Green Buildings
Results of the third empirical case are presented in Table 5. We find that total counts of green
buildings (both total LEED and government-owned LEED) are highly and positively correlated with
population growth rates of metropolitan or micropolitan statistical areas between 2005 and 2013.
Unsurprisingly, fast-growing urban areas tend to see more new construction, and thus are more likely
to see more new green (e.g., energy efficient) building construction. Conditional on that background
growth rate, new green-certified buildings show very strong tendencies to be located in areas with
fewer minorities and with more highly educated residents, although the income effect is not significant.
The subset of those buildings that are government owned, however, tend to be more equally distributed
across both income and racial groups. Thus, while government-owned LEED buildings still tend to be
built in more highly-educated urban areas, they are at least neutral with respect to race and income.
The private sector, on the other hand, exhibits a tendency to certify new green buildings in more white
urban areas. The significant race and education factors, combined with an insignificant role of income,
raise important justice concerns and warrant additional investigation about causes.
Public green procurement policies can have positive spillover effects on private-sector demand
for green infrastructure [45]. What the results in Table 5 show, however, may warrant concern
from the perspective of equity. The neutrality (with respect to common EJ variables) of the
government procurement evident in Table 5 is not matched by the overall adoption of green buildings,
which suggests that stimulating the private sector may not translate into similar neutrality of adoption.
Public procurement may spur inequitable private adoption spillovers. It also may be the case that
much of the government-owned LEED building adoption is driven by state and local rules that tend to
bind only on government buildings (rather than private sector building stock). Thus, Table 5 results
may reflect a difference in the urban areas that have stricter requirements for new public building
construction as much as it does a bias in how public procurement stimulates adoption in the private
sector. Although governments have often used procurement policies to promote equality on the
basis of race, ethnicity, and gender [79], our results show that the ultimate impact of government
procurement on green building adoptions can be unequal.
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(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Hispanic 0.00550 0.00258 0.00275 −0.00769 *** −0.00916 *** −0.00938 ***
(0.00395) (0.00428) (0.00416) (0.00275) (0.00299) (0.00287)
Black −0.000462 −0.00131 −0.00434 −0.0142 *** −0.0155 *** −0.0162 ***
(0.00617) (0.00643) (0.00642) (0.00421) (0.00435) (0.00434)
Population 0.851 *** 0.883 *** 0.898 *** 0.950 *** 0.973 *** 0.972 ***
(0.0620) (0.0698) (0.0673) (0.0408) (0.0449) (0.0436)
College 0.0658 *** 0.0691 *** 0.0658 *** 0.0589 *** 0.0593 *** 0.0587 ***
(0.00849) (0.00884) (0.00883) (0.00577) (0.00599) (0.00594)
mIncome −0.115 −0.500 −0.470 −0.0287 −0.235 −0.239
(0.391) (0.422) (0.419) (0.272) (0.291) (0.287)
%popchg0005 0.00799 −0.000504
(0.0102) (0.00682)
%popchg0513 0.0135 *** 0.00421 *
(0.00488) (0.00245)
Constant −10.88 *** −7.216 * −7.778 * −11.71 *** −9.755 *** −9.734 ***
(3.870) (4.174) (4.122) (2.709) (2.911) (2.854)
Observations 514 464 466 514 464 466
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
5. Conclusions
Sustainable energy transition efforts driven by multi-level government actions can have significant
justice implications. This paper offers both theoretical and empirical analyses that contribute to the
emerging energy justice literature from a policy perspective. We first propose a policy evaluation
framework that explicitly links clean energy policy design choices to important justice considerations.
Critical policy design choices that can bear on important justice considerations are discussed. To offer
more empirical evidence, our empirical cases then explore the distributive justice implications of
three clean energy policies and programs at the federal, utility, and city levels in the US. Based on
our theoretical framework and three empirical cases, we conclude this paper by offering several
implications for equitable energy policymaking. We are limiting our conclusions to the three cases,
and this is not an attempt to generalize across all energy programs and policies.
First, examining energy justice from a policy perspective can be complicated, as inequalities can
occur in different dimensions. Public policies can directly affect who deploys clean energy through
incentives and regulations. They also have indirect justice implications through their influence on
energy market prices or private sector adoption of clean energy. The distribution of policy costs
may raise additional justice concerns (See Granqvist and Grover [51], for instance, for a discussion
of how the large cost of clean energy infrastructure can and should be fairly distributed across social
groups). Moreover, some policy impacts are second-order environmental benefits resulting from the
replacement of fossil fuel generation by clean energy. Future extension to this work should explore
whether or not ensuring distributive justice in clean energy investments and regulation outcomes
improves the second-order environmental justice.
Second, our empirical analyses show that clean energy program designs incorporate justice
components to varying degrees in our cases. Guided by the policy goal of diversity and inclusion,
the selection of SGIG projects tends to favor low-income groups, although the Hispanic population is
in a disadvantaged position in terms of the amount of funding received. Regulation of clean energy
investments by IOUs often follows the dominant economic approach that pursues efficient outcomes.
There is little attention in policy design in these areas to fulfill justice principles. Utility regulation
likely produces inequality in the decision of technology rollouts. Public procurement at the state and
city levels lead to a relatively equal distribution of LEED certified public buildings, but this does
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not translate into equal adoptions by the private sector. While the primary goal of these policies is
to facilitate energy transition and climate mitigation, more attention may be needed to more evenly
spread the gains beyond the advantaged and politically vital groups in society.
Third, our theoretical discussion tentatively links policy design choices to various aspects of
energy justice. Policies affecting energy justice can take many forms, and we offered brief examples of
financial, regulatory, and procurement aspects. Each revealed some core theoretical justice elements in
addition to empirical evidence on equity concerns. It serves as an important step to integrate energy
justice considerations in energy policy making. However, it is not the goal of this study to establish
causal relationships between policy design variables and distributive justice outcomes. Future work
could also investigate the links between procedural/recognition justice and distributive justice.
While our study provides insights into three empirical clean energy programs, it should be
considered only a first step in examining energy justice from a policy perspective. These cases
emphasize governmental actors, but many critical justice aspects of clean energy policies and
programs involve nongovernmental actors like households and private utilities. Even as clean energy
programs can more or less promote equitable distributions, power and governance structures in
the context of broader institutions (e.g., regulated markets, taxation systems) recommend more
comprehensive examinations.
Future research should investigate other widely adopted clean energy policies and programs,
such as net metering policies, electric vehicle tax credits and home retrofit offerings. While our study of
all utilities in fifteen US states provides important information at a statistical level, future research can
develop more comprehensive datasets for a nationwide analysis. In addition, energy justice analysis at
different levels of spatial specificity, for instance, the census tract or block levels, should be conducted.
Where good data are available, additional studies could focus on individual household level, examine
specific clean energy technology adoption options, and how technology deployment correlates with
household socioeconomic and racial characteristics.
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